Introduction
This chapter provides a overview of Bayesian inference, mostly emphasising that it is a universal method for summarising uncertainty and making estimates and predictions using probability statements conditional on observed data and an assumed model (Gelman 2008) . The Bayesian perspective is thus applicable to all aspects of statistical inference, while being open to the incorporation of information items resulting from earlier experiments and from expert opinions.
We provide here the basic elements of Bayesian analysis when considered for standard models, refering to Marin and Robert (2007) and to Robert (2007) for book-length entries.
1
In the following, we refrain from embarking upon philosophical discussions about the nature of knowledge (see, e.g., Robert 2007, Chapter 10) , opting instead for a mathematically sound presentation of an eminently practical statistical methodology. We indeed believe that the most convincing arguments for adopting a Bayesian version of data analyses are in the versatility of this tool and in the large range of existing applications, rather than in those polemical arguments (for such perspectives, see, e.g., Jaynes 2003 and MacKay 2002) .
The Bayesian argument

Bases
We start this section with some notations about the statistical model that may appear to be over-mathematical but are nonetheless essential.
Given an independent and identically distributed (iid) sample D n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) from a density f θ , with an unknown parameter θ ∈ Θ, like the mean µ of the benchmark normal distribution, the associated likelihood function is
This quantity is a fundamental entity for the analysis of the information provided about the parameter θ by the sample D n , and Bayesian analysis relies on this function to draw inference on θ.
2 Since all models are approximations of reality, the choice of a sampling model is wideopen for criticisms (see, e.g., Templeton 2008) , but those criticism go far beyond Bayesian modelling and question the relevance of completely built models for drawing inference or running predictions. We will therefore address the issue of model assessment later in the chapter.
The major input of the Bayesian perspective, when compared with a standard likelihood approach, is that it modifies the likelihood-which is a simple function of θ-into a posterior distribution on the parameter θ-which is a probability distribution on Θ defined by
The factor π(θ) in (1) is called the prior (often omitting the qualificative density) and it necesssarily has to be determined to start the analysis. A primary motivation for introducing this extra-factor is that the prior distribution summarizes the prior information on θ; that is, the knowledge that is available on θ prior to the observation of the sample D n . However, the choice of π(θ) is often decided on practical or computational grounds rather than on strong subjective beliefs or on overwhelming prior information. As will be discussed later, there also exist less subjective choices, made of families of so-called noninformative priors.
The radical idea behind Bayesian modelling is thus that the uncertainty on the unknown parameter θ is more efficiently modelled as randomness and consequently that the probability distribution π is needed on Θ as a reference measure. In particular, the distribution P θ of the sample D n then takes the meaning of a probability distribution on D n that is conditional on [the event that the parameter takes] the value θ, i.e. f θ is the conditional density of x given θ. The above likelihood offers the dual interpretation of the probability density of D n conditional on the parameter θ, with the additional indication that the observations in D n are independent given θ. The numerator of (1) is therefore the joint density on the pair (D n , θ) and the (standard probability calculus) Bayes theorem provides the conditional (or posterior) distribution of the parameter θ given the sample D n as (1), the denominator being called the marginal (likelihood) m(D n ).
There are many arguments which make such an approach compelling. When defining a probability measure on the parameter space Θ, the Bayesian approach endows notions such as the probability that θ belongs to a specific region with a proper meaning and those are particularly relevant when designing measures of uncertainty like confidence regions or when testing hypotheses. Furthermore, the posterior distribution (1) can be interpreted as the actualisation of the knowledge (uncertainty) on the parameter after observing the data. At this early stage, we stress that the Bayesian perspective does not state that the model within which it operates is the "truth", no more that it believes that the corresponding prior distribution π it requires has a connection with the "true" production of parameters (since there may even be no parameter at all). It simply provides an inferential machine that has strong optimality properties under the right model and that can similarly be evaluated under any other welldefined alternative model. Furthermore, the Bayesian approach includes techniques to check prior beliefs as well as statistical models (Gelman 2008) , so there seems to be little reason for not using a given model at an earlier stage even when dismissing it as "un-true" later (always in favour of another model).
Bayesian analysis in action
The operating concept that is at the core of Bayesian analysis is that one should provide an inferential assessment conditional on the realized value of D n , and Bayesian analysis gives a proper probabilistic meaning to this conditioning by allocating to θ a (reference) probability (prior) distribution π. Once the prior distribution is selected, Bayesian inference formally is "over"; that is, it is completely determined since the estimation, testing, prediction, evaluation, and any other inferential procedures are automatically provided by the prior and the associated loss (or penalty) function.
3 For instance, if estimationsθ of θ are evaluated via the quadratic loss function L(θ,θ) = θ −θ 2 , the corresponding Bayes procedure is the expected value of θ under the posterior distribution,
for a given sample D n . For instance, observing a frequency 38/58 of survivals among 58 breast-cancer patients and assuming a binomial B(58, θ) with a uniform U(0, 1) prior on θ leads to the Bayes estimate When no specific loss function is available, the estimator (2) is often used as a default estimator, although alternatives also are available. For instance, the maximum a posteriori estimator (MAP) is defined aŝ
where the function to maximize is usually provided in closed form. However, numerical problems often make the optimization involved in finding the MAP far from trivial. Note also here the similarity of (3) with the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE): The influence of the prior distribution π(θ) progressively disappears with the number of observations, and the MAP estimator recovers the asymptotic properties of the MLE. See Schervish (1995) Figure 1 (left) Data describing the survival rates of some breast-cancer patients (Bishop et al. 1975) and (right) representation of two gamma posterior distributions differentiating between malignant (dashes) versus non-malignant (full) breast cancer survival rates.
As an academic example, consider the contingency table provided in Figure 1 on survival rate for breast-cancer patients with or without malignant tumours, extracted from Bishop et al. (1975) , the goal being to distinguish between the two types of tumour in terms of survival probability. We then consider each entry of the table on the number of survivors (first column of figures in Figure 1 to be independently Poisson distributed P(N it θ i ), where t = 1, 2, 3, denotes the age group, i = 1, 2, the tumor group, distinguishing between malignant (i = 1) and non-malignant (i = 2), and N it is the total number of patients in this age group and for this type of tumor. Therefore, denoting by x it the number of survivors in age group t and tumor group i, the corresponding density is
The corresponding likelihood on θ i (i = 1, 2) is thus
which, under an θ ∼ Exp(2) prior, leads to the posterior
The choice of the (prior) exponential parameter corresponds to a prior estimate of 50% survival probability over the period. 4 In the case of the non-malignant breast cancers, the parameters of the (posterior) Gamma distribution are a = 136 and b = 161, while, for the malignant cancers, they are a = 96 and b = 133. Figure 1 shows the difference between both posteriors, the nonmalignant case being stochastically closer to 1, hence indicating a higher survival rate. (Note that the posterior in this figure gives some weight to values of θ larger than 1. This drawback can easily be fixed by truncated the exponential prior at 1.)
Prior distributions
The selection of the prior distribution is an important issue in Bayesian modelling. When prior information is available about the data or the model, it can be used in building the prior, and we will see some illustrations of this recommendation in the following chapters. In many situations, however, the selection of the prior distribution is quite delicate in the absence of reliable prior information, and generic solutions must be chosen instead. Since the choice of the prior distribution has a considerable influence on the resulting inference, this choice must be conducted with the utmost care. It is indeed straightforward to come up with examples where a particular choice of the prior leads to absurd decisions. Hence, for a Bayesian analysis to be sound the prior distribution needs to be well-justified. Before entering into a brief description of some existing approaches of constructing prior distributions, note that, as part of model checking, every Bayesian analysis needs to assess the influence of the choice of the prior, for instance through a sensitivity analysis. Since the prior distribution models the knowledge (or uncertainty) prior to the observation of the data, the sparser the prior information is, the flatter the prior should be. There actually exists a category of priors whose primary aim is to minimize the impact of the prior selection on the inference: They are called noninformative priors and we will detail them below. When the sample model is from an exponential family of distributions 5 with densities of the form
where θ · R(x) denotes the canonical scalar product in R p , there exists an associated class of priors called the class of conjugate priors, of the form π(θ|ξ, λ) ∝ exp {θ · ξ − λΨ(θ)} , which are parameterized by two quantities, λ > 0 and ξ, λξ being of the same nature as R(y). These parameterized prior distributions on θ are appealing for the simple computational reason that the posterior distributions are exactly of the same form as the prior distributions; that is, they can be written as
where
is defined in terms of the sample of observations D n (Robert 2007, Section 3.3.3) . Equation (4) simply says that the conjugate prior is such that the prior and posterior densities belong to the same parametric family of densities but with different parameters. In this conjugate setting, it is the parameters of the posterior density themselves that are "updated", based on the observations, relative to the prior parameters, instead of changing the whole shape of the distribution. To avoid confusion, the parameters involved in the prior distribution on the model parameter are usually called hyperparameters. (They can themselves be associated with prior distributions, then called hyperpriors.)
The computation of estimators, of confidence regions or of other types of summaries of interest on the conjugate posterior distribution often becomes straightforward.
As a first illustration, note that a conjugate family of priors for the Poisson model is the collection of gamma distributions Γ(a, b), since
leads to the posterior distribution of θ given X = x being the gamma distribution Ga(a + x, b + 1). (Note that this includes the exponential distribution Exp(2) used on the dataset of Figure 1 . The Bayesian estimator of the average survival rate, associated with the quadratic loss, is then given byθ = (1 + x 1 + x 2 + x 3 )/(2 + N 1 + N 2 + N 3 ), the posterior mean.) As a further illustration, consider the case of the normal distribution N (µ, 1), which is indeed another case of an exponential family, with θ = µ, R(x) = x, and Ψ(µ) = µ 2 /2. The corresponding conjugate prior for the normal mean µ is thus normal,
This means that, when choosing a conjugate prior in a normal setting, one has to select both a mean and a variance a priori. (In some sense, this is the advantage of using a conjugate prior, namely that one has to select only a few parameters to determine the prior distribution. Conversely, the drawback of conjugate priors is that the information known a priori on µ either may be insufficient to determine both parameters or may be incompatible with the structure imposed by conjugacy.) Once ξ and λ are selected, the posterior distribution on µ for a single observation x is determined by Bayes' theorem,
i.e. a normal distribution with mean (1 + λ) −1 (x + ξ) and variance (1 + λ) −1 . An alternative representation of the posterior mean is
that is, a weighted average of the observation x and the prior mean λ −1 ξ. The smaller λ is, the closer the posterior mean is to x. The general case of an iid sample D n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) from the normal distribution N (µ, 1) is processed in exactly the same manner, sincex n is a sufficient statistic with normal distribution N (µ, 1/n): the 1's in (5) are then replaced with
2 ) with an unknown θ = (µ, σ 2 ) also allows for a conjugate processing. The normal distribution does indeed remain an exponential family when both parameters are unknown. It is of the form
where s
2 . Therefore, the conjugate prior on θ is the product of an inverse gamma distribution on σ 2 , I G (λ σ , α/2), and, conditionally on σ 2 , a normal distribution on µ, N (ξ, σ 2 /λ µ ). The apparent simplicity of conjugate priors is however not a reason that makes them altogether appealing, since there is no further (strong) justification to their use. One of the difficulties with such families of priors is the influence of the hyperparameter (ξ, λ). If the prior information is not rich enough to justify a specific value of (ξ, λ), arbitrarily fixing (ξ, λ) = (ξ 0 , λ 0 ) is problematic, since it does not take into account the prior uncertainty on (ξ 0 , λ 0 ) itself. To improve on this aspect of conjugate priors, a more ameanable solution is to consider a hierarchical prior, i.e. to assume that γ = (ξ, λ) itself is random and to consider a probability distribution with density q on γ, leading to
as a joint prior on (θ, γ). The above is equivalent to considering, as a prior on θ
As a general principle, q may also depend on some further hyperparameters η. Higher order levels in the hierarchy are thus possible, even though the influence of the hyper(-hyper-)parameter η on the posterior distribution of θ is usually smaller than that of γ. But multiple levels are nonetheless useful in complex populations as those found in animal breeding (Sørensen and Gianola 2002) .
Instead of using conjugate priors, even when mixed with hyperpriors, one can opt for the so-called noninformative (or vague) priors ) in order to attenuate the impact on the resulting inference. These priors are defined as refinements of the uniform distribution, which rigorously does not exist on unbounded spaces. A peculiarity of those vague priors is indeed that their density usually fails to integrate to one since they have infinite mass, i.e. Θ π(θ)dθ = +∞, and they are defined instead as positive measures, the first and foremost example being the Lebesgue measure on R p . While this sounds like an invalid extension of the standard probabilistic framework-leading to their denomination of improper priors-, it is quite correct to define the corresponding posterior distributions by (1), provided the integral in the denominator is defined, i.e.
In some cases, this difficulty disappears when the sample size n is large enough. In others like mixture models (see also Section 3), the impossibility of using a particular improper prior may remain whatever the sample size is. It is thus strongly advised, when using improper priors in new settings, to check that the above finiteness condition holds.
The purpose of noninformative priors is to set a prior reference that has very little bearing on the inference (relative to the information brought by the likelihood function). More detailed accounts are provided in Robert (2007, Section 1.5) about this possibility of using σ-finite measures in settings where genuine probability prior distributions are too difficult to come by or too subjective to be accepted by all.
While a seemingly natural way of constructing noninformative priors would be to fall back on the uniform (i.e. flat) prior, this solution has many drawbacks, the worst one being that it is not invariant under a change of parameterisation. To understand this issue, consider the example of a Binomial model: the observation x is a B(n, p) random variable, with p ∈ (0, 1) unknown. The uniform prior π(p) = 1 could then sound like the most natural noninformative choice; however, if, instead of the mean parameterisation by p, one considers the logistic parameterisation θ = log(p/(1 − p)) then the uniform prior on p is transformed into the logistic density
by the Jacobian transform, which is not uniform. There is therefore a lack of invariance under reparameterisation, which in its turn implies that the choice of the parameterisation associated with the uniform prior is influencing the resulting posterior. This is generaly considered to be a drawback. Flat priors are therefore mostly restricted to location models x ∼ p(x − θ), while scale models
are associated with the log-transform of a flat prior, that is,
In a more general setting, the (noninformative) prior favoured by most Bayesians is the socalled Jeffreys ' (1939) prior, which is related to Fisher's information I F (θ) by
where |I| denotes the determinant of the matrix I.
Since the mean µ of a normal model N (µ, 1) is a location parameter, the standard choice of noninformative prior is then π(µ) = 1 (or any other constant). Given that this flat prior formally corresponds to the choice λ = µ = 0 in the conjugate prior, it is easy to verify that this noninformative prior is associated with the posterior distribution N (x, 1). An interesting consequence of this remark is that the posterior density (as a function of the parameter θ) is then equal to the likelihood function, which shows that Bayesian analysis subsumes likelihood analysis in this sense. Therefore, the MAP estimator is also the maximum likelihood estimator in that special case. Figure 2 provides the posterior distributions associated with both the flat prior on µ and the conjugate N (0, 0.1σ
2 ) prior for a crime dataset discussed in Marin and Robert (2007) . The difference between both posteriors is still visible after 90 observations and it illustrates the impact of the choice of the hyperparameter (ξ, λ) on the resulting inference. 
Confidence intervals
As should now be clear, the Bayesian approach is a complete inferential approach. Therefore, it covers among other things confidence evaluation, testing, prediction, model checking, and point estimation. Unsurprisingly, the derivation of the confidence intervals (or of confidence regions in more general settings) is based on the posterior distribution π(θ|D n ). Since the Bayesian approach processes θ as a random variable and conditions upon the observables D n , a natural definition of a confidence region on θ is to determine C(D n ) such that
where α is either a predetermined level such as 0.05. 6 or a value derived from the loss function (that may depend on the data).
The important difference from a traditional perspective is that the integration here is done over the parameter space, rather than over the observation space. The quantity 1 − α thus corresponds to the probability that a random θ belongs to this set C(D n ), rather than to the probability that the random set contains the "true" value of θ. Given this drift in the interpretation of a confidence set (rather called a credible set by Bayesians in order to stress this major difference with the classical confidence set), the determination of the best 7 confidence set turns out to be easier than in the classical sense: It simply corresponds to the values of θ with the highest posterior values,
where k α is determined by the coverage constraint (7). This region is called the highest posterior density (HPD) region.
When the prior distribution is not conjugate, the posterior distribution is not necessarily so easily-managed. For instance, if the normal N (µ, 1) distribution is replaced with the Cauchy distribution, C (µ, 1), in the likelihood
there is no conjugate prior available and we can consider a normal prior on µ, say N (0, 10). The posterior distribution is then proportional tõ
Solvingπ(µ|D n ) = k is not possible analytically, only numerically, and the derivation of the bound k α requires some amount of trial-and-error in order to obtain the correct coverage. Figure 3 gives the posterior distribution of µ for the observations x 1 = −4.3 and x 2 = 3.2. For a given value of k, a trapezoidal approximation can be used to compute the approximate coverage of the HPD region. For α = 0.95, a trial-and-error exploration of a range of values of k then leads to an approximation of k α = 0.0415 and the corresponding HPD region is represented in Figure 3 ((left). As illustrated in the above example, posterior distributions are not necessarily unimodal and thus the HPD regions may include several disconnected sets. This may sound counterintuitive from a classical point of view, but it must be interpreted as indicating indeterminacy, either in the data or in the prior, about the possible values of θ. Note also that HPD regions are dependent on the choice of the reference measure that defines the volume (or surface).
The analytic derivation of HPD regions is rarely straightforward but let us stress that, due to the fact that the posterior density is most known up to a normalising constant, those regions can be easily derived from posterior simulations. For instance, Figure 3 (right) illustrates this derivation in the case of a normal N (θ, σ 2 ) model with both parameters unknown and Jeffreys' prior, when the sufficient statistics are x = 0 and s 2 = 1, based on n = 10 observations.
Testing Hypotheses
Deciding about the validity of some restrictions on the parameter θ or on the validity of a whole model-like whether or not the normal distribution is appropriate for the data at hand-is a major and maybe the most important component of statistical inference. Because the outcome of the decision process is clearcut, accept (coded by 1) or reject (coded by 0), the construction and the evaluation of procedures in this setup are quite crucial. While the Bayesian solution is formally very close to a likelihood ratio statistic, its numerical values and hence its conclusions often strongly differ from the classical solutions.
Decisions
Without loss of generality, and including the setup of model choice, we represent null hypotheses as restricted parameter spaces, namely θ ∈ Θ 0 . For instance, θ > 0 corresponds to Θ 0 = R + . The evaluation of testing procedures can be formalised via the 0 − 1 loss that equally penalizes all errors: If we consider the test of H 0 : θ ∈ Θ 0 versus H 1 : θ ∈ Θ 0 , and denote by d ∈ {0, 1} the decision made by the researcher and by δ the corresponding decision procedure, the loss
is associated with the Bayes decision (estimator)
This estimator is easily justified on an intuitive basis since it chooses the hypothesis with the largest posterior probability. The Bayesian testing procedure is therefore a direct transform of the posterior probability of the null hypothesis.
The Bayes Factor
A notion central to Bayesian testing is the Bayes factor
, which corresponds to the classical odds or likelihood ratio, the difference being that the parameters are integrated rather than maximized under each model. While it is a simple oneto-one transform of the posterior probability, it can be used for Bayesian testing without resorting to a specific loss, evaluating the strength of the evidence in favour or against H 0 by the distance of log 10 (B π 10 ) from zero (Jeffreys 1939) . This somehow ad-hoc perspective provides a reference for hypothesis assessment with no need to define the prior probabilities of H 0 and H 1 , which is one of the advantages of using the Bayes factor. In general, the Bayes factor does depend on prior information, but it can be perceived as a Bayesian likelihood ratio since, if π 0 and π 1 are the prior distributions under H 0 and H 1 , respectively, B π 10 can be written as
thus replacing the likelihoods with the marginals under both hypotheses. Thus, by integrating out the parameters within each hypothesis, the uncertainty on each parameter is taken into account, which induces a natural penalisation for larger models, as intuited by Jeffreys (1939) . The Bayes factor is connected with the Bayesian information criterion (BIC, see Robert 2007, Chapter 5) , with a penalty term of the form d log n/2, which explicits the penalisation induced by Bayes factors in regular parametric models. In a wide generality, the Bayes factor asymptotically corresponds to a likelihood ratio with a penalty of the form d * log n * /2 where d * and n * can be viewed as the effective dimension of the model and number of observations, respectively, see (Berger et al. 2003, Chambaz and Rousseau 2008) . The Bayes factor therefore offers the major interest that it does not require to compute a complexity measure (or penalty term)-in other words, to define what is d * and what is n * -, which often is quite complicated and may depend on the true distribution.
Point null hypotheses
When the hypothesis to be tested is a point null hypothesis, H 0 : θ = θ 0 , there are difficulties in the construction of the Bayesian procedure, given that, for an absolutely continuous prior π,
Rather logically, point null hypotheses can be criticized as being artificial and impossible to test (how often can one distinguish θ = 0 from θ = 0.0001?!), but they must also be processed, being part of the everyday requirements of statistical analysis and also a convenient representation of some model choice problems (which we will discuss later). Testing point null hypotheses actually requires a modification of the prior distribution so that, when testing H 0 : θ ∈ Θ 0 versus H 1 : θ ∈ Θ 1 , π(Θ 0 ) > 0 and π(Θ 1 ) > 0 hold, whatever the measures of Θ 0 and Θ 1 for the original prior, which means that the prior must be decomposed as
with positive weights on both Θ 0 and Θ 1 . Note that this modification makes sense from both informational and operational points of view. If H 0 : θ = θ 0 , the fact that the hypothesis is tested implies that θ = θ 0 is a possibility and it brings some additional prior information on the parameter θ. Besides, if H 0 is tested and accepted, this means that, in most situations, the (reduced) model under H 0 will be used rather than the (full) model considered before. Thus, a prior distribution under the reduced model must be available for potential later inference. (Formaly, the fact that this later inference depends on the selection of H 0 should also be taken into account.) In the special case Θ 0 = {θ 0 }, π 0 is the Dirac mass at θ 0 , which simply means that P π0 (θ = θ 0 ) = 1, and we need to introduce a separate prior weight of H 0 , namely,
Then,
.
In the case when x ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ) and µ ∼ N (ξ, τ 2 ), consider the test of H 0 : µ = 0. We can choose ξ equal to 0 if we do not have additional prior information. Then the Bayes factor is the ratio of marginals under both hypotheses, µ = 0 and µ = 0,
is the posterior probability of H 0 . Table 1 gives an indication of the values of the posterior probability when the normalized quantity x/σ varies. This posterior probability again depends on the choice of the prior variance τ 2 : The dependence is actually quite severe, as shown below with the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox.
The Ban on Improper Priors
Unfortunately, this decomposition of the prior distribution into two subpriors brings a serious difficulty related to improper priors, which amounts in practice to banning their use in testing situations. In fact, when using the representation
the weights P π (θ ∈ Θ 0 ) and P π (θ ∈ Θ 1 ) are meaningful only if π 0 and π 1 are normalized probability densities. Otherwise, they cannot be interpreted as weights. In the instance when x ∼ N (µ, 1) and H 0 : µ = 0, the improper (Jeffreys) prior is π 1 (µ) = 1; if we write
then the posterior probability is
A first consequence of this choice is that the posterior probability of H 0 is bounded from above by π(µ = 0|x) ≤ 1/(1 + √ 2π) = 0.285 . Table 2 provides the evolution of this probability as x goes away from 0. An interesting point is that the numerical values somehow coincide with the p-values used in classical testing (Casella and Berger 2001 ).
If we are instead testing H 0 : θ ≤ 0 versus H 1 : θ > 0, then the posterior probability is
and the answer is now exactly the p-value found in classical statistics. The difficulty in using an improper prior also relates to what is called the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox, a phenomenon that shows that limiting arguments are not valid in testing settings. In contrast with estimation settings, the noninformative prior no longer corresponds to the limit of conjugate inferences. In fact, for a conjugate prior, the posterior probability
converges to 1 when τ goes to +∞, for every value of x, as already illustrated by Figure 4 . This noninformative procedure differs from the noninformative answer [1 + √ 2π exp(x 2 /2)] −1 above. The fundamental issue that bars us from using improper priors on one or both of the sets Θ 0 and Θ 1 is a normalizing difficulty: If g 0 and g 1 are measures (rather than probabilities) on the subspaces Θ 0 and Θ 1 , the choice of the normalizing constants influences the Bayes factor. Indeed, when g i is replaced by c i g i (i = 0, 1), where c i is an arbitrary constant, the Bayes factor is multiplied by c 0 /c 1 . Thus, for instance, if the Jeffreys prior is flat and g 0 = c 0 , g 1 = c 1 , the posterior probability
is completely determined by the choice of c 0 /c 1 . This implies, for instance, that the function [1 + √ 2π exp(x 2 /2)] −1 obtained earlier has no validity whatsoever. Since improper priors are an essential part of the Bayesian approach, there have been many proposals to overcome this ban. Most use a device that transforms the prior into a proper probability distribution by using a portion of the data D n and then use the other part of the data to run the test as in a standard situation. The variety of available solutions is due to the many possibilities of removing the dependence on the choice of the portion of the data used in the first step. The resulting procedures are called pseudo-Bayes factors. See Robert (2007, Chapter 5 ) for more details.
The case of nuisance parameters
In some settings, some parameters are shared by both hypotheses (or by both models) that are under comparison. Since they have the same meaning in each of both models, the above ban can be partly lifted and a common improper prior can be used on these parameters, in both models.
For instance, consider a regression model, represented as
where X denotes the (n, p) matrix of regressors-upon which the whole analysis is conditioned-, y the vector of the n observations, and β is the vector of the regression coefficients. (This is a matrix representation of the repeated observation of
when i varies from 1 to n.) Variable selection in this setup means removing covariates, that is, columns of X, that are not significantly contributing to the expectation of y given X. In other words, this is about testing whether or not a null hypothesis like H 0 : β 1 = 0 holds. From a Bayesian perspective, a possible non informative prior distribution on the generic regression model (8) is the so-called Zellner's (1986) g-prior, where the conditional 8 π(β|σ) prior density corresponds to a normal
distribution on β, A T denoting the transposed matrix associated with A, and where a "marginal" improper prior on σ 2 , π(σ 2 ) = σ −2 , is used to complete the joint distribution. With this default (or reference) prior modelling, and when considering the submodel corresponding to the null hypothesis H 0 : β 1 = 0, with parameters β (−1) and σ, we can use a similar g-prior distribution
where X −1 denotes the regression matrix missing the column corresponding to the first regressor, and σ 2 ∼ π(σ 2 ) = σ −2 . Since σ is a nuisance parameter in this case, we may use the improper prior on σ 2 as common to all submodels and thus avoid the indeterminacy in the normalising factor of the prior when computing the Bayes factor Figure 5 reproduces a computer output from Marin and Robert (2007) that illustrates how this default prior and the corresponding Bayes factors can be used in the same spirit as significance levels in a standard regression model, each Bayes factor being associated with the test of the nullity of the corresponding regression coefficient. For instance, only the intercept and the coefficients of X 1 , X 2 , X 4 , X 5 are significant. This output mimics the standard lm R function outcome in order to show that the level of information provided by the Bayesian analysis goes beyond the classical output. (We stress that all items in the table of Figure 5 are obtained via closed-form formulae.) Obviously, this reproduction of a frequentist output is not the whole purpose of a Bayesian data anlysis, quite the opposite: it simply reflects on the ability of a Bayesian analysis to produce automated summaries, just as in the classical case, but the inferencial abilities of the Bayesian approach are considerably wider. (For instance, testing simultaneously the nullity of β 3 , β 6 , . . . , β 10 is of identical difficulty, as detailed in Marin and Robert 2007 Figure 5 R output of a Bayesian regression analysis on a processionary caterpillar dataset with ten covariates analysed in Marin and Robert (2007) . The Bayes factor on each row corresponds to the test of the nullity of the corresponding regression coefficient.
Extensions
The above description of inference is only an introduction and is thus not representative of the wealth of possible applications resulting from a Bayesian modelling. We consider below two extensions inspired from Marin and Robert (2007) .
Prediction
When considering a sample D n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) from a given distribution, there can be a sequential or dynamic structure in the model that implies that future observations are expected. While more realistic modeling may involve probabilistic dependence between the x i 's, we consider here the simpler setup of predictive distributions in iid settings. If x n+1 is a future observation from the same distribution f θ (·) as the sample D n , its predictive distribution given the current sample is defined as
The motivation for defining this distribution is that the information available on the pair (x n+1 , θ) given the data D n is summarized in the joint posterior distribution f θ (x n+1 )π(θ|D n ) and the predictive distribution above is simply the corresponding marginal on x n+1 . This is nonetheless coherent with the Bayesian approach, which then considers x n+1 as an extra unknown. For the normal N (µ, σ 2 ) setup, using a conjugate prior on (µ, σ 2 ) of the form
and the predictive on x n+1 is derived as
Therefore, the predictive of x n+1 given the sample D n is a Student's t distribution with mean ξ(D n ) and 2λ σ + n degrees of freedom. In the special case of the noninformative prior, λ µ = λ σ = α = 0 and the predictive is
. This is again a Student's t distribution with mean x n ), scale s x / √ n, and n degrees of freedom.
Outliers
Since normal modeling is often an approximation to the "real thing," there may be doubts about its adequacy. As already mentioned above, we will deal later with the problem of checking that the normal distribution is appropriate for the whole dataset. Here, we consider the somehow simpler problem of assessing whether or not each point in the dataset is compatible with normality. There are many different ways of dealing with this problem. We choose here to take advantage of the derivation of the predictive distribution above: If an observation x i is unlikely under the predictive distribution based on the other observations, then we can argue against its distribution being equal to the distribution of the other observations.
For each x i ∈ D n , we consider f 
Model choice
For model choice, i.e. when several models are under comparison for the same observation
where I can be finite or infinite, the usual Bayesian answer is similar to the Bayesian tests as described above. The most coherent perspective (from our viewpoint) is actually to envision the tests of hypotheses as particular cases of model choices, rather than trying to justify the modification of the prior distribution criticised by Gelman (2008) . This also incorporates within model choice the alternative solution of model averaging, proposed by Madigan and Raftery (1994) , which strives to keep all possible models when drawing inference.
The idea behind Bayesian model choice is to construct an overall probability on the collection of models ∪ i∈I M i in the following way: the parameter is θ = (i, θ i ), i.e. the model index and given the model index equal to i, the parameter θ i in model M i , then the prior measure on the parameter θ is expressed as dπ(θ) = i∈I p i dπ i (θ i ), i∈Ii p i = 1.
As a consequence, the Bayesian model selection associated with the 0-1 loss function and the above prior is the model that maximises the posterior probability
across all models. Contrary to classical pluggin likelihoods, the marginal likelihoods involved in the above ratio do compare on the same scale and do not require the models to be nested. As mentioned in Section 3.5 integrating out the parameters θ i in each of the models takes into account their uncertainty thus the marginal likelihoods Θi f i (x|θ i )π i (θ i )dθ i are naturally penalised likelihoods. In most parametric setups, when the number of parameters does not grow to infinity with the number of observations and when those parameters are identifiable. the Bayesian model selector as defined above is consistent, i.e. with increasing numbers of observations, the probability of choosing the right model goes to 1.
